Self-similarity is the property of a system being similar to a part of itself. We posit that a special class of behaviourally self-similar systems exhibits a degree of resilience to adversarial behaviour. We formalise the notions of system, adversary and resilience in operational terms, based on transition systems and observations. While the general problem of proving systems to be behaviourally selfsimilar is undecidable, we show, by casting them in the framework of well-structured transition systems, that there is an interesting class of systems for which the problem is decidable. We illustrate our prescriptive framework for resilience with some small examples, e.g., systems robust to failures in a fail-stop model, and those avoiding side-channel attacks.
Introduction
Building systems that are resilient to actions of adversarial environments is an important software engineering concern. In this paper, we propose a class of systems whose resilience arises from a notion of self-similarity. An object is said to be "structurally self-similar" if it is similar to a proper part of itself. An important quality of the class of self-similar structures is that they are scale-invariant. In analogy, we consider a class of systems that are behaviourally self-similar -the behaviour of the system as a whole is "equivalent" to that of a part of the system -and develop a framework for showing how systems in this class are resilient to adversarial actions. The intuition behind our thesis is that if a part of a system is sufficient to exhibit the behaviour of the system as a whole, then the rest of the system provides redundancy, which in turn may provide resilience against a hostile environment. The notion of resilience is with respect to that of an adversary, a general concept pervading computing science, i.e., any way of choosing inputs or an environment that can thwart a program from achieving its desired behaviour.
A trivial example of a behaviourally self-similar system is a constant signal. Its behaviour during any interval of time is equivalent to its behaviour during an initial (arbitrarily small) interval, which is repeated ad infinitum. The signal can be considered to be resilient to an adversary that determines when to sample the output value, in that it is able to map the adversary's sampling interval to a more convenient input (the initial interval) for which its behaviour has been defined. Such "delay-tolerance" may also be seen in other time-independent functions.
The notion of behavioural self-similarity finds common currency in formal languages, in concurrency theory, as well as in programming. In formal languages, we have a ready example of a construction that supports behavioural self-similarity, namely the Kleene star, as (e * ) * ≈ e * . Note that the construct ( ) * is semantically idempotent, a property that is often associated with fault-tolerance. The replication operation in process calculi such as the π-calculus [15] is another example of self-similarity: !p ≈!p !p, where ≈ denotes (behavioural/semantic) equivalence. It is also idempotent since !!p ≈!p, for any process p. Indeed, in any recursive program scheme, we can find a syntactic part that behaves in a manner similar to the entire system. Consider, e.g., a recursive equation X ≈ F[X ], for some non-trivial context F[ ]. By construction, X is a fortiori operationally equivalent to the expression F [X ] . The semantics attached to such recursive equations involves finding an appropriate fixed point, usually the least fixed point, preferably by a (finite) iterative process. Observe that placing any solution to this equation in the context F[ ] is a (behaviourally) idempotent operation 1 .
From these examples, a naïve idea arises linking system structure, behavioural self-similarity and resilience: If, assuming no adversarial action, a part q of a system p can behave as the whole system does, then this part can be considered to provide the core functionality of the system; the rest of the system (the "context" C[ ], where p ≡ C [q] ) serves to neutralise adversarial actions or transform the interactions of the adversarial environment A with the system into a form which this "core" q can digest, and thereby make the system behave as though adversarial action by A were absent.
Resilience. We say that a system p is resilient to an adversary A if its observable behaviour in the presence of adversarial action is equivalent to its behaviour in the absence of the adversary: p • A ≈ p, where • represents coupling the system p with the adversary A 2 . A somewhat similar formulation has been explored earlier by Liu, Joseph, Peled, Janowski and others [14, 17, 11 ], but we believe our formulation is more natural (discussed in §1.1). Now, if p can be expressed by C[q] as above, and in the absence of an adversary, C[q] ≈ q, we have, by transitivity, the desired resilience to the adversary A arising from self-similarity. Resilience in this sense should not be equated with a notion of correctness; a system may be resilient even if it is not correct with respect to a given specification. Note that if ≈ is a congruence,
Adversary model. An adversary can be viewed as a way of forcing the program to face an unfavourable environment. The class of adversaries may be expressed in any of a variety of ways: as processes in a language, as automata or transition systems, as logical constraints on behaviour, etc. All that our framework requires is that the program coupled with the adversary is a transition system on which a reasonable notion of observational equality can be defined. We include in the class of adversaries a completely benign adversary, denoted 1 A , who behaves as if there were no adversary present when coupled with any system. If the adversarial model is specified as a transition system, we require that it be well-structured, with 1 A A for any A in the class of adversaries.
We identify here some constraints on what an adversary can and cannot do. (i) Adversaries may act in ways completely unrestricted by the system. (ii) Adversarial moves, except for announcement of error, are not directly observable. This is justifiable in that most adversaries are sneaky, not bruiting their actions, until and unless they wish to announce that they have defeated the system, i.e., a denouement err. (iii) An adversary cannot directly prevent the system from making any observable move by removing an enabled action. (iv) An adversary can, however, interact with the system, and make joint moves. These interactions too may not be directly observable, but may cause the system to (eventually) produce different observable effects from its normal behaviour.
Structure of the paper. In the sequel, we develop this idea by formalising the notions of a system's behaviour, adversarial action, resilience and a methodology for proving a system to be resilient, by fac-toring a system into its "core" and fault-tolerant context. This is followed by a discussion of related work ( §1.1). Formalisation ( §2) of both system and adversarial behaviour is done in the very general setting of transition systems. We employ a process calculus notation for expressing processes, and the associated structural operational semantics helps in relating structure to behavioural self-similarity. In this paper, we use suitable notions of observation and equivalence, namely, those of barbs and bisimulation [16] , since we consider systems closed when coupled with an adversary. While other behavioural equivalences may be considered, we chose bisimulation since it is the finest extensional notion of equivalence of observable behaviour. Proposition 1 expresses the soundness of our proposed methodology.
In general, proving bisimilarity of transition systems, and consequently showing a system to be behaviourally self-similar, is undecidable. However, we can show that this problem is decidable for an interesting class of systems (Proposition 2) by using the framework of Well-Structured Transition Systems (WSTS) [6] . The WSTS conditions required for establishing decidability seem to arise very naturally from the constraints placed on the context and adversary.
We then illustrate our prescriptive framework for resilience with small examples ( §3), such as systems robust to failures in a fail-stop model, and defeating side-channel attacks. In the examples in this paper, which progress from finite to finite-control to infinite state systems, we do not propose any new mechanisms for building resilient systems. We deploy the familiar armoury of devices -redundancy, replication, retry, and repetition -for countering the arsenal at the adversary's disposal. However, our framework may be seen as providing a formal (methodological) justification of these constructions. While fault-resistance has earlier been shown using rigorous mathematical techniques, we believe that our use of the WSTS framework provides the basis for automated techniques for proving resilience, especially in the case of infinite-state systems. We illustrate our approach by conveying only the intuition for the different examples, and omit the tedious details of the proofs. In §4, we conclude with a discussion of our approach, its limitations, alternative frameworks for specifying and verifying resilience to adversarial behaviour, as well as some directions for future work.
Methodology.
Our proposed methodology is:
1. We identify a class of adversaries, with a least adversary 1 A . Adversarial moves are not normally observable, except perhaps for a final barb err.
2. We decompose the system process p into a core q which provides the basic functionality and
In general, the context may be multi-holed. The context C[ ] should not alter the core functionality of q. In particular, it should satisfy the following conditions:
(a) C[ ] should permit q to make any of its possible moves, i.e., q
and q jointly make a move, then all of q's possible barbs are preserved, i.e., if 
3. We then specify the coupling p • A of a process and an adversary as a transition system. Formally, we will require that this transition system be a WSTS. In particular, this composite transition system should exhibit the upward simulation property (defined in §2). We dub the conditions on the context and the adversary listed above the self-similarity constraints.
Beyond finite-state systems. While our examples in this paper are small, our framework is not confined to dealing with finite (or finite-state) systems, for which it may be easy to show the required bisimilarity. Accordingly, we explore systems that provide sufficient structural properties to ensure that bisimilarity is decidable. We find that Well-Structured Transition Systems (WSTSs) [6] Often the adversary itself can be formulated as a WSTS with a least element 1 A representing the absence of an adversary. The composite transition system is obtained from those of the system and the adversary, and a pointwise combination of the system and adversary orderings yields the desired ordering relation for the WSTS. We say that the composition with adversary A is
This is usually the case with parallel composition in most process calculi.
The self-similarity constraints on the context and adversary imply the following properties:
For monotone compositions with adversaries, this further implies
• For an observable o, q ⇓ o if and only if C[q] ⇓ o.
What remains is to place reasonable effectiveness constraints on the WSTSs in order to ensure that bisimilarity is decidable. We require that the states of the system and the class of adversaries are recursive sets and that the ordering is decidable. We also assume that the transition systems are finitelybranching. In order to ensure decidability, we require that the transition systems satisfy a technical condition of having an effective pred-basis, and exhibit downward reflexive simulation (these definitions are recalled in §2).
Contributions and Related Work
We are unaware of any previous work where the notion of self-similarity has been wedded to that of behavioural equivalence to formulate a notion of a system being resilient to actions by an adversarial environment. Furthermore, we believe that the methodology we enunciate -construing a system as being constructed of a core behaviour and a context for handling the actions of a formally defined adversarial environment -is novel, as also casting them in the framework of Well-Structured Transition Systems [6] . The structural decomposition of the system into core and fault-absorbing context seems natural and dovetails nicely with the WSTS conditions. As a consequence, the bisimulation proofs become much easier. Moreover, the effectiveness conditions provide decidability, and thus in principle at least, support automated techniques for showing resilience that can work even for infinite-state systems. We also believe that our third example, which deals with a building block for converting communication over a non-FIFO channel with omission failures to a FIFO-channel with omission failures, has not been presented earlier in its essential form.
The idea of formulating fault tolerance in terms of behavioural equivalence is not new [14, 17, 11] . The idea of a fault preorder, capturing the relative severity of faults, can be found in the works of Janowski, Krishnan and others [11, 12, 14] . Janowski, e.g., studies the problem of monotonicity of fault tolerance -a system tolerant of faults higher in the preorder should tolerate faults lower in the preorder, but finds that this requirement does not square well with the standard notion of bisimilarity. A similar observation is made by Krishnan [12] , where he considers replicated systems to model systems with synchronous majority voting. Accordingly, a notion of bisimilarity parameterised by the fault model is proposed [11, 12] . In contrast, we believe that the notion of behaviour should be uniform and therefore formulate the notion of resilience to an adversary using a standard notion of equivalence, e.g., weak (asynchronous) barbed bisimulation [16, 2] .
Another major difference with these approaches [10, 11] is that they formulate the faulty versions of the system by incorporating the anticipated faulty behaviour into definitions of the system. We see this is as unsatisfactory in that the adversarial behaviour has to be expressed concretely and within the syntax of the system (e.g., in the CCS formulation), thereby severely restricting the expressive power given to the adversary. It is also not a very satisfactory way of composing adversaries. Janowski uses the technique of incorporating the faulty version with the original system by providing a redefinition of the original system taking a non-deterministic choice of the two behaviours. This approach does not work well, e.g., with modelling a fail-stop model, because "revenant" processes become possible -a system which is supposed to have failed, rises Lazarus-like and exhibits some active behaviour. In contrast, our formulation uses a very general framework of transition systems, which may be specified and combined in any convenient manner. Indeed, the syntactic formulation used for describing the example systems is only a convenient way for specifying a transition system and the constructive nature of fault-resilient transformations.
There is also some similarity between our work and that of Liu, Joseph, Peled and others, in e.g., [14, 17] , where they present frameworks in which fault-tolerance is expressed by transforming a process with respect to the specification of a fault model: q is a ψ-tolerant implementation of p if p ≈ T (q, ψ), for a transformation T ( , ). The juxtaposition of the recovery algorithm is viewed as a transformation that makes a process fault-tolerant. The connections between these logic-based ideas and our preliminary operational formulation deserves further study.
The Framework

Transition Systems
A transition system T = S, −→ consists of a set of states S and a transition relation −→⊆ S×S. A finite trace σ with respect to T is a sequence of states s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n such that s i −→ s i+1 for all 0 ≤ i < n. An infinite trace with respect to T can be considered to be a function σ : N → S such that for all i ∈ N: σ (i) −→ σ (i + 1). We write σ 1 σ 2 to denote the concatenation of traces, which in the case of σ 1 being an infinite trace, results in σ 1 .
The successors and predecessors of a state s ∈ S, are defined as Succ(s) = {s ′ | s −→ s ′ } and Pred(s) = {s ′ | s ′ −→ s} respectively. The notations −→ n , −→ = , −→ + and −→ * are used for the n-step iteration, reflexive closure, transitive closure and reflexive-transitive closure of the transition relation −→. We use a similar notation for the n-step iterations, and closures of Succ and Pred. T is finitely-branching if Succ(s) is finite for each s.
Assuming a notion of observable actions, we define a barb as an observable action that a process has the potential to perform, written p ↓ o (where o is observable) [16] . We will use "weak barbs" which depict the potential of a process to perform an observable action after making some "silent" transitions,
A weak barbed simulation is a binary relation R on processes such that if
R is a weak barbed bisimulation if both R and its symmetric inverse R −1 are weak barbed simulations. Processes p 1 and p 2 are weakly barbed bisimilar, written p 1 ≈ b p 2 , if they are related by some weak barbed bisimulation. Weak barbed bisimulation is not fine enough to distinguish processes that differ after the first communication (barb), when they interact with other processes, so the equivalence relation usually desired is a refinement that is preserved under parallel composition.
However, for closed systems, it is reasonable to use weak barbed bisimulation as the notion of equivalence.
Process notation.
In our examples, we employ a process calculus notation akin to a value-passing CCS. Let a represent a channel, x a variable, and v a value drawn from some set of values. We assume without further specification that the language includes a syntactic category of expressions e, which contains in particular variables and integer-valued expressions. In our examples, expressions may also include tuples, and we assume a matching operation. Terms in the language of communicating processes, typically p, p 1 , p 2 are specified inductively by the following abstract syntax:
The process 0 is inert. The prefix ae stands for the output of the value of e on channel a, whereas ax.p stands for input of a value over channel a with the value bound to x in the continuation p. p 1 p 2 represents parallel composition whereas p 1 + p 2 stands for non-deterministic choice between p 1 and p 2 . The notation (a)p 1 describes the restriction operation on channels, i.e., channel a is local to scope p 1 . Communication on restricted channels is not observable. [e 1 = e 2 ]p is a conditional matching operation. !p represents the replication of process p, yielding as many copies of p as desired, running in parallel. For convenience, we include parameterized (recursive) processes of the form P(e 1 , . . . e n ).
In a distributed system, we associate processes with locations, written for instance as ℓ[|p|], where ℓ is a location constant. A context C[ ] is a process term with a hole [ ] in the place of a process term. We may also have multi-hole contexts. We do not present here the formal rules for the operational semantics of this language. Indeed, these constructs can be encoded in a core asynchronous calculus with replication and choice restricted to guarded processes. We refer the reader to any standard presentation of such asynchronous calculi [9, 2] for the encodings and the operational semantics rules.
Well-structured Transition Systems
We now summarise some results about WSTSs [6] . A quasi-order or pre-order S, consists of a set S with any reflexive and transitive relation ⊆ S × S. S, is well-ordered (henceforth a wqo) if for any infinite sequence s 0 , s 1 , . . . there exist indices i and j with i < j such that s i s j . Consequently, a wqo has no infinite strictly decreasing sequence, nor any infinite sequence of unrelated elements. It also follows that in a wqo, any infinite sequence s 0 , s 1 , . . . has an infinite non-decreasing subsequence s i 0 s i 1 s i 2 . . . where i 0 < i 1 < i 2 . . .. In quasi-order S, , an upward-closed set is any set I ⊆ S such that if x ∈ I and x y, then y ∈ I. Let ↑ x = {y | x y}, called the upward closed set induced by x. A basis for an upward closed set I is a set
Higman's Lemma states that if S, is a wqo, then any upward-closed set I has a finite basis. The minimal elements of I form a basis, and these must be finite, since otherwise, they would include an infinite sequence of unrelated elements. Further, any chain of upward-closed sets I 0 ⊆ I 1 ⊆ I 2 ⊆ . . . stabilises, i.e., for some k, I j = I k for every j ≥ k.
has an effective pred-basis [6] if there exists an algorithm that, given any state s ∈ S, computes pb(s), a finite basis of ↑ Pred(↑ s), i.e., minimal elements of the upward-closed set induced by the predecessors of states in the upward-closed set induced by s. Backward reachability analysis involves computing Pred * (J) as the limit of a chain J i , where
If J is upward-closed, then this process converges, and Pred
has an effective pred-basis and is decidable, then if any upward-closed J is given via its finite basis, one can compute a finite basis of Pred * (J).
The covering problem is, given states s and t, to decide whether there exists a t ′ such that s −→ * t ′ and t t ′ . The covering problem is decidable for T = S, −→, with an effective pred-basis and decidable . If T = S, −→, exhibits downward reflexive simulation, and if Succ is computable and decidable, then one can compute for any s a finite basis of ↑ Succ * (s).
The sub-covering problem is to decide, given s and t, whether there exists t ′ such that s −→ * t ′ and t ′ t. Subcovering is decidable for any WSTS which shows downward reflexive simulation, if Succ is computable and decidable. Putting the pieces together, we get the following method for proving whether a putatively faulttolerant process p ≡ C[q] is indeed resilient (or not) to an adversary A, where C[ ] denotes the faultdigesting context and q its core functionality:
Proposition 1 A process p is resilient to adversary A while providing behaviour q if p can be expressed as C[q] such that C[ ] and A satisfy the self-similarity constraints, and C[q] • A ⇓ err.
Proof: Consider C[q] • A. We wish to show
• Upward Simulation: The adversary does not directly restrict any action of the system. Since 1 A represents the non-existence of an adversary, q 
. This is downward simulated by q making no move.
Moreover 
Again, since this move is unobservable, this is downward simulated by q • 1 A making no move, since q
⊡ Thus, our prescriptive framework of crafting self-similar processes and formalising adversarial behaviour operationally yields the desired resilience. If the two systems are not barbed bisimilar, then the process is not fault tolerant, and a counter-example may be found. Another way of looking at the definition of resilience is that adversarial moves keep the composite system within the same behavioural equivalence class.
Dealing with infinite state systems.
Since the state spaces may potentially be infinite, there may not be an effective method to prove that C[q] • A and q • 1 A are bisimilar. In order for this question to be decidable, we place the restrictions mentioned earlier, namely that the WSTS has an effective pred-basis, that the successor relation is effectively computable, and that the conditions on adversarial moves ensure reflexive downward simulation. The "self-similar subterm" orderings are clearly decidable. 
Proposition 2 The problem of deciding whether a process is resilient to an adversary is decidable if in addition to satisfying the self-similarity constraints, the coupled transition system has an effective pred-basis, and the successor relationship is effectively computable.
Proof: Suppose q • 1 A −→ t. We need to show that there is a t ′ such that C[q] • A −→ * t ′ and t t ′ . This is an instance of the covering problem for C[q] • A and t, which is decidable under the assumptions.
Now suppose C[q]
• A −→ t. We need to show that there is a t ′ such that q −→ * t ′ and t ′ t. This is an instance of the sub-covering problem for q and t, which is decidable when context/adversarial/joint moves are simulated downwards in 0 steps, and successors are effectively computable. Proof technique:
Compute K b , the finite basis for Succ
Examples
In this section we put our proposed methodology to test by applying it in situations that demand resilience of a system to an adversary. Our examples proceed from finite to finite-control to infinite state systems.
In each case, we apply the methodology of identifying the core computation that would have sufficed in the absence of an adversary. We then identify an adversary and show how by constructing an absorptive context satisfying the self-similarity conditions presented earlier, one can defeat the adversary. The wqo notion used is usually simple, though the later examples, involving resilience in distributed systems, motivate the need for more flexible notions than simple embedding of a process into a context. However, they retain the essential semantic requirement that the context preserves the ability of a process to perform its actions, and that the context neither contributes any observable actions directly, nor does it take away the observables of the core process. It can at best interact with other parts of the context and/or with the adversary.
White Noise to defeat Side-channel Attacks
Let c be a deterministic finite computation which generates an observable result m in n steps: c −→ n c ′ ↓ m. Normally, observers cannot see the number of steps taken by c. Let us now consider an adversary that can see in addition to this outcome, the "side property" of how many steps were taken to termination 4 .
If it observes that c terminates within n steps, it flags err. A class of step-counting adversaries can be coded as A(i, k) for k ≥ 0, with the behaviour of the composite transition system c • A(i, n) given by the following rules:
Note that the adversary does not suppress any observable of p, and makes no observable moves except signalling err. In the absence of an adversary monitoring the side-channel, we have c • 1 A ⇓ m, but in the presence of such an adversary, c • A(0, n) ⇓ err as well. Thus if c 1 is a program behaviourally equivalent to c but which takes more than n steps to terminate, this adversary can distinguish between c and c 1 as
We now justify the correctness of the method of interleaving a computation with an indeterminate number of NOPs to defeat such side-channel attacks. Let WhiteNoise be a computation that consumes cycles, but does not generate any observables, e.g., WhiteNoise −→ WhiteNoise. WhiteNoise does not suppress or alter any normal observables of computations running in parallel/interleaved with it. Consider the context C[ ] = WhiteNoise f [ ], and suppose f is a weakly fair (nondeterministic 5 ) interleaved implementation of parallel composition that executes at least one step of WhiteNoise. Now note that while
It is straightforward to show that C[ ] and A(0, n) satisfy the self-similarity conditions. We cast the composite system as a WSTS, using the "self-similar subterm" ordering on processes. In particular, we consider as minimal elements (which form a finite basis) all processes c ′ such that c −→ * c ′ . The effective pred-basis is then easy to compute. It is therefore easy to prove that 
Replicated server
The next example involves finite-control, and justifies the use of repetition to address multiplicity of requests and spatial replication to counter failure. Consider a one-time provider of a file v: OTP = av, where a is the channel on which v is sent. Similarly, a basic client is rendered as BC i = ax.d i x, which receives some file x on the channel a, and delivers it to the client's application layer, written as d i x. The single-request client-provider system is written as Sys 1 = (a)(BC 1 OTP) . The only observable barb of Sys 1 is the unrestricted send action d 1 v. If the file provider has to deal with more than one client, or if the client repeatedly requests the file, we need an ever-obliging responsive server, represented as a process that can repeatedly send file v on the channel a.
Typically, the server is located at some site ℓ 1 , written in a distributed calculus (e.g., [18] ) as ℓ 1 [|. . .|], which may be different from the client's site. For simplicity we have the Server located at ℓ 1 repeatedly sending the file over a to whoever wishes to receive it 6 . In the distributed setting,
↓ o only when site ℓ 1 is "up" (locations do not figure in the observable barbs). Observe that the context in which OTP is placed contributes no barbs, and has a hole in a position that is enabled. Consider the new system:
The observable barbs are d i v, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Since a is restricted, the send actions on a do not contribute any observable barb. This construction also handles the case when the clients repeatedly request a value, i.e., when
Now consider an adversary A that can cause location ℓ 1 to fail, taking the server down permanently in the fail-stop model (see e.g., [3, 18] ) after which no client can receive any file from the Server. Observe that the requirement that ℓ 1 needs to be "up" for a barb to be observable means that the coupling with the adversary is not monotone. The adversary can be modelled as a transition system with states that represent the set of locations that are "up" and the transition {ℓ 1 } −→ {} to model the failure of ℓ 1 . It is now possible to have trace suffixes in which Sys 2 • A ⇓ d i v whereas Sys 2 • 1 A ⇓ d i v, for some value(s) of i. Thus, Sys 2 is not resilient to an adversary that can cause a single location to fail.
We build a server resilient to a single node failure by replicating the responsive file provision on two sites, ℓ 1 and ℓ 2 . Fault tolerance is provided by using the two hole context
that places a process in two holes both at head positions, and satisfying all the requisite self-similarity conditions for the context, yielding a replicated responsive server:
The server process located at ℓ i can execute only if that location has not failed (fail-stop model of failure) -it provides the value v on channel a while its site is up. Let
Client BC i can read a value on channel a either from the server at ℓ 1 or ℓ 2 , whichever is up; if both are up, it obtains the value from either one (the location of the server is not observable). So if either or both
The adversary A, which is able to cause at most one node to fail, can be modelled by a finite state machine, which may make a transition from a state in which both {ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 } are up, to states where ℓ 1 (respectively ℓ 2 ) is down, and then remains in that state (modelling fail-stop of at most one of the two sites). The benign adversary 1 A can be modelled as a single-state FSM (with a self-loop). It is easy to formulate the composite system as a WSTS, by using the self-similar subterm ordering on processes, and the obvious trivial ordering on the adversary FSMs. It is also easy to exhibit the minimal elements and the effectiveness conditions for this system. Thus we can prove that Sys 3 • A ≈ Sys 2 • 1 A . This being a finite-control system, the proof is quite easy. Our WSTS-based framework is also able to handle extensions to the system to permit persistent clients, which repeatedly request the file and deliver it ad nauseum.
Replicating RepServer again by placing it in C rep [ ] serves no purpose with respect to an adversary that can cause only one of the ℓ i to fail 7 . However, if the adversary can cause k > 1, to fail, then a replication context should place the server at least k + 1 locations.
Reliable transmission
We now address resilience to adversaries that make communication channels unreliable. Instead of presenting yet another verification of the ABP protocol [4] and its bisimulation proofs, which have been published several times before (e.g., [13] ), we describe a small protocol for communication between a client R and a server Sr over a channel c that may arbitrarily reorder messages and omit messages. This protocol can be used as a basic building block within a larger protocol that builds a FIFO channel over a non-FIFO layer [1] . To our knowledge, this construction has not been earlier presented in as simple a formulation. Its core is similar to the "probe" construct of Afek and Gafni [7] .
The server is extremely simple: it receives a request on channel b, and sends a message on channel c. At any point of time, it may segue to sending another value v ′ .
where v ′ = v and v, v ′ ∈ D, some set of values (which we assume for convenience is of cardinality k). The server is representable as a (parameterised) non-deterministic finite-control machine. A simple client R s can be expressed as: R s = b.cx.dx.R s , where R s sends requests on b and, on receiving a value on channel c, delivers it over channel d and repeats. If channel c does not omit or reorder values, R s will produce all the values sent by the server in FIFO order. If, however, b, c are lossy channels, then some requests (or responses) may be lost in transmission. R s may therefore get stuck waiting for messages. We make the client more persistent, modifying R s to R o ,
which decouples the (repeated) request sending on b from the receipt of messages on c. Since it works with lossy channels, R o may omit delivering some messages, but all delivered messages appear in the order in which they were sent. Note that we have placed the three communication actions in three distinct "holes"
If, however, the channel c can reorder messages, it is possible to confuse messages corresponding to earlier requests with those for later requests. While this problem can be addressed by placing serial numbers on the messages, an interesting question is whether it can be solved without that mechanism. Accordingly, we modify the client:
The client initiates a round of the protocol by sending a request to the server on channel b. Since the responses from the server may be reordered or dropped by the response channel c, the client has no way of knowing whether a response it receives is acknowledging its current request (a "fresh" message), or whether it is a response to a previous request. However, by pigeon-holing, if it receives more responses than pending unanswered requests from the past, it knows that the server has acknowledged its most recent request. For this it keeps a variable p, which is the number of requests sent in this round, and bounds the number of responses it requires for each value so that when it receives a response on c, it can determine that it has got enough responses to safely conclude that the value is a fresh one. Note that in our soution, the server remains unchanged, and in the client, all the parameters take non-negative integral values.
Let A ro be an adversary that may reorder and omit messages (the interesting ability of the adversary lies in its being able to reorder responses on channel c), and let A o be an adversary that may only omit messages on channel c. The equivalence to be established is:
One may notice that the process R o is not exactly syntactically embedded within a context in R ro . However, the essence of the self-similarity constraints is met as every communication action comes into an enabled position at exactly corresponding points marked by the holes [ ] 1 , [ ] 2 , [ ] 3 . Thus, the resulting ordering on processes would (while still being decidable) be more complex, but nonetheless adheres to the self-similarity requirements and those of being a WSTS. In defining the states of the coupled transition system we consider the states of the server Sr, and that of the client R o and R ro . In identifying the latter, we demarcate as significant the three marked holes as points where to pin control. The start of a "round" is a significant point where the control of the R o process is matched with that of the R ro process. We take into account the parameters of the R ro process in framing the relation. Finally, we consider the channel states, adapting the subword ordering that has been used for lossy channels in order to deal with lossy-reordering channels. The details are omitted here, but WSTS technique provides a novel way of proving operationally the correctness of a protocol that has an unbounded state space.
By orienting this protocol in both directions, one can, at the price of counters (for the pending and new messages) obtain an implementation of a FIFO channel over a lossy reordering communication channel. The only way we know to avoid the counters is using sequence numbers on data items, as in [19] , but this implies an infinite message alphabet. For practical purposes, one usually assumes that sequence numbers can be recycled (in a "sliding window" fashion) under the belief that the channel does not deliver an "ancient" message. On similar lines, if one assumes a bound on the number of messages the channel may delay, then our counters can be limited by that bound. This may be a reasonable assumption since, as shown in [1] , in any implementation of a FIFO channel over a lossy reordering one with a finite message alphabet, the more the messages that the channel delays, the more the messages that need be transmitted.
Conclusion
The question of whether a specified program behaviour can be achieved versus an arbitrary adversary is, of course, undecidable in general, with several famous impossibility results. Even the question of whether a given program is resilient to some particular adversary is in general not decidable.
What we have sought to do is to formalise an intuitive connection between resilience to an adversary and the self-similarity in the structure and behaviour of a program. It is a prescriptive framework, and we recognise that there are several other ways of correctly constructing fault-tolerant systems that do not fit this methodology. The program is constructed in terms of its core functionality (that generates the observables) and an absorptive context that soaks up the adversarial actions, but otherwise neither contributes nor detracts from the observable behaviour of a program 8 . While in our framework, we require that the adversary's moves are not directly observable (except in a denouement), the interaction between the adversary and the program may result in different observables from the normal execution. However, a fault-resilient program exhibits no difference.
Another way of thinking about the framework we have proposed is in terms of abstractions that operate as follows: consider the traces of the system by itself, and also those of the system composed with the adversary. Consider the equivalence relation that arises from an abstraction function which has the property of "stuttering" over moves by the adversary. A system may be considered tolerant of an adversary if every adversarial transition is within an induced equivalence class. While there is a certain simplicity to such an account, our proposed framework is richer in at least some respects: First, it is able to account for moves made in conjunction between the adversary and the system (the interactive moves). Second, it is able to relate the structure of the system with its behavioural self-similarity, and capture the intuition that the seemingly redundant parts of a program provide resilience against adversaries.
We are unaware of any published work on relating self-similarity with resilience. While there has been a body of work in which adversaries have been classified according to a partial order based on the severity of their disruptive capabilities, and relativising the notion of behavioural equivalence based on the adversary model, we believe this is less elegant or compelling than an account where a standard notion of behavioural equivalence is used. While we have used barbed bisimulation, other notions of equivalence may be appropriate in certain settings, and may provide easier methods for proving resilience. Another shortcoming of the previous approaches is that the adversarial model was incorporated into the syntax of the processes, whereas our approach supports more eclectic styles of specifying the transition system of processes in the context of an adversary.
Further, while the previous approaches seem to be confined to finite (or at best finite state processes) -where it is possible to find appropriate bisimulation relations, we are able to deal with a class of infinitestate systems by couching the problem in a WSTS framework. Although there has been substantial work on WSTSs, our use in proving systems to be fault-resilient seems to be novel. We believe that one can in this framework also deal with composite adversarial models by combining the fault-resilient contexts in novel ways (e.g., embedding one kind of resilient context inside another), although this is beyond the scope of the current paper.
As we have presented very simple examples and introduced no new mechanisms for resilience, it may seem that the results are unsurprising. However, it is satisfying to not only confirm the correctness of intuitive constructions and folklore but also find an effective basis for demonstrating their correctness. It would be interesting to study whether our framework also provides a way of discovering minimal constructions for resilience against particular adversaries.
Of course, our proposed methodology should be put to further tests. For instance, it would be interesting to see whether techniques for building resilience in storage systems such as RAID [5] would be amenable to these techniques. A major area which needs addressing concerns cryptographic protocols and resilience in the face of cryptanalytic adversaries. The challenge there is to find the right notion of structural orderings, and recognising the contexts that provide resilience. Another domain that deserves greater study is coding theory and the use of redundant bits to provide error-correction. It is not obvious in such techniques whether convergence (reaching fixed-points) can be obtained.
In the future, we would also like to explore conditions under which, given a specification of the operational behaviour of the adversary, and the core functionality, it may be possible (if at all) to synthesise the fault-resilient context. We would like to develop a framework analogous to those of Liu, Joseph et al. where fault-tolerant versions of systems are developed using a stepwise refinement methodology, and transformations dealing with combined fault models.
In the current paper, we have used an operational framework; in the future, we would like to explore a logic-based formulation, using e.g., knowledge-based analysis techniques to reason about resilience in the same way that correctness of distributed systems/protocols has been studied [8] .
